

Bolstering Governance: The Need for a Multifaceted Approach to United States Counterterrorism Policy in the Horn of Africa Region

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Abstract

In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, the United States learned the painful lesson vis-à-vis Al Qaeda's relationship with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan that affording terrorist organizations the opportunity to operate without impunity in varying territories allows for major terrorist operations to be planned and executed without hindrance. Although the Afghanistan region thus understandably became the primary focus of the United States' resulting war on terror, another region that warrants considerable focus in such regard remains the Horn region of Africa which boasts a multitude of weak states that have proven either unwilling or unable to establish law and order within ungoverned territories that are proving increasingly attractive to terrorist organizations as sources of sanctuary, transit, and operation. This paper on a state by state basis assesses the to degree to which terrorist organizations have successfully utilized the Horn of Africa region as sources of safe haven in light of both weak governance and ongoing regional conflict. Accordingly, this paper encourages the United States to adopt a multifaceted counterterrorism strategy in the Horn region that aims to encourage key states to bolster governance and reduce regional conflict, thereby reducing the Horn region's conduciveness to terrorist activity.

Key Words: Horn of Africa, United States, Counterterrorism Policy, Bolstering Governance, Ungoverned Territories, Regional Conflict

Introduction

Whereas the date of September 11th, 2001 is understandably considered by many to be the fateful date on which Al Qaeda launched its war against the United States of America, such line of thinking tends to overlook the equally important date of August 7th, 1998, on which Al Qaeda certainly demonstrated initial capacity to wreak destruction upon American targets. In an operation that is commonly referred to simply as the Embassy Bombings, the morning of August 7th, 1998 brought Osama bin Laden's terrorist organization its first large scale victory against the United States. Although the attacks, which destroyed the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, killing twelve Americans and 212 Africans, were met with a swift diplomatic and military response by the Clinton Administration in the form of sanctions against the Sudanese government for having long harbored bin Laden as well as air strikes against

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suspected Al Qaeda facilities in the Sudan as well as Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, no comprehensive counterterrorism initiatives were directed towards Al Qaeda's presence in Africa at the time. While greater attention has certainly been rendered to Al Qaeda's presence in Africa by US policymakers following the September 11th attacks as part of the global War on Terror, lack of a concerted US policy vis-à-vis the reality of a terrorism threat in Africa seems a recurring theme. Indeed, scholars Princeton Lyman and Stephen Morrison lament that while "countering the rise of extremism has been a central part of US strategy in the Middle East, the same has not generally been true for Africa" (Lyman & Morrison, 2004, p. 75). This is particularly alarming given that Africa boasts a multitude of weak states that have proven either unwilling or unable to establish law and order within ungoverned territories that are proving increasingly attractive to terrorists as sources of sanctuary, transit, and operation. The importance of African states possessing the capacity to govern their respective territories cannot be overstated as indeed Angel Rabasa, Steven Boraz, Peter Chalk, Kim Cragin, Theodore Karasik, et al., in an exhaustive analysis of the varying security risks posed by ungoverned territories, note that the 9/11 attacks clearly demonstrated how "terrorists can use sanctuaries in the most remote and hitherto ignored regions of the world to mount devastating attacks against the United States and its friends and allies" (Rabasa et al., 2007, p. iii). Whereas President Bush, in a tour of Africa following the September 11th attacks, displayed a keen understanding of the need for US policymakers and African officials to work together in confronting the challenges of terrorism posed by weak state capacity in Africa by calling for greater intelligence sharing and cooperation between the US and African nations, scholars readily observe that mere rhetoric will not suffice to address the situation at hand. Indeed, Greg Mills, in a concise analysis of Africa's strategic significance in the War on Terror, observes that "understanding the relationship between Africa and terrorism so that effective policies can be established to address it will require that US and African policymakers go beyond simple platitudes about shared interests and the they engage in difficult discussion about how to increase the ability of African states to command their own territories" (Davis, 2007, p. 19). In this regard, the eastern Horn region of Africa warrants special attention and consideration.

Without question, the Horn region of Africa remains an especially volatile region in terms of proving a hotbed for terrorist activity. Lyman and Morrison observe that "the greater Horn of Africa- an area that includes the Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, and Kenya- is home to interlocking conflicts, weak and failing states, pervasive corruption, and extreme poverty" (Lyman & Morrison, 2004, p. 76), conditions that have both proven to generate a breeding ground for radicalization in addition to having been readily exploited by terrorist organizations in order to facilitate sanctuary, transit, and operation. As such, it seems unlikely that counterterrorism operations alone will prove sufficient in mitigating a continued terrorist threat in the Horn region. Robert Rotberg, in a detailed analysis of ongoing counterterrorism efforts in the Horn region, contends that "the eradication of existing terrorist cells and potential future terrorist threats and combinations cannot be achieved without careful, considered attention to uplifting governance in general throughout the region and boosting particular political goods selectively, country by country" (Rotberg, 2005, p. 6). While the Horn region is home to the formidable US Central Command's Combined Joint Task Force- Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) based in Djibouti that has at times engaged in cross-border nation-building efforts towards the aim of mitigating conditions likely to prove conducive for terrorist activity, it remains largely understaffed and cannot be expected to bear the full brunt of any comprehensive nation building policy designed to improve the infrastructure and governing capacity of key Horn nations.

Moreover, the mere idea of any sustained nation building campaign in the Horn region is likely to seem unpalatable and to therefore be met with considerable resistance, as beleaguered US attempts at nation building in Iraq and Afghanistan have become increasingly weary to the American public. Regardless, analysis of the terrorist threat emanating from varying Horn nations due to the relative incapacity of such nations to provide security and governance to its people reveals that the United States and its allies must prove willing to effect policy that will both enable and embolden Horn nations to adequately and responsibly govern their respective territories if in fact the Horn region is to be prevented from becoming a thriving center of terrorist activity.

Harboring Evil: The Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, and Somalia

In any discussion of terrorism centering upon the Horn of Africa region, the Sudan remains an obvious focal point due to its long and well documented history of having proven a sanctuary for terrorist activity. Nowhere is the Sudan's harboring of terrorists more blatant than in the case of the regime of Hassan al Turabi providing sanctuary to Osama bin Laden throughout the better part of the 1990s. The 9/11 Commission Report makes clear the Sudan's having thus been an integral factor in the creation of the international Al Qaeda terrorist network, noting that after being encouraged to move his entire operation to the Sudan in 1991 by the newly in power Turabi, bin Laden "agreed to help Turabi in an ongoing war against African Christian separatists in southern Sudan and also to do some road building" (9/11 Commission Report, 2002, p. 57) in exchange for Turabi's letting bin Laden "use Sudan as a base for worldwide business operations and for preparations for jihad" (9/11 Commission Report, 2002, p. 57). Due to his arrangement with Turabi, bin Laden was able to build a truly global network of terrorist contacts throughout the Islamic world. Although bin Laden was forced to flee from the Sudan in 1996 due to mounting economic pressure from the US upon Khartoum to expel him as well as to the loss of his benefactor Turabi as a result of Turabi's declining influence in favor of Sudanese President Omar al Bashir, the Sudan has remained a haven for terrorism thanks to government unwillingness to provide stability within Sudan's borders. Although much focus is often rendered to the Bashir government's sponsoring of the Islamic Janjaweed militia's campaign of ethnic cleansing in the Sudan's southern region as having provided an atmosphere conducive for terrorist activity in the past, Rabasa et al. also draw particular attention to the Jebel Kurish mountain range in Sudan's northeastern territory, noting that "as there is no real Sudanese government or army control over the mountains that terrorists are easily able to slip through the cracks, up into the hills where they can train, rest and build up the spirit of jihad" (Rabasa et al., 2007, p. 158). It is for this very reason the authors further, "that Al Qaeda in 2004 set up multiple refugee and training camps in the area" (Rabasa et al., 2007, p. 158). Moreover, while the creation of the new state of South Sudan in July of 2011 has resulted in decreased instances of government backed atrocity in the region, South Sudan's infrastructure remains weak, thus allowing for an environment that is conducive for terrorist activity to readily endure. Indeed, the State Department's 2011 Countries Report on Terrorism unequivocally states that as new country, South Sudan "suffers from multiple institutional weaknesses that includes insufficient policing and intelligence gathering, inadequate border controls, and deficient airport security and screening at the country's two international airports" (Countries Report on Terrorism, 2011, p. 33). Such conditions have already allowed Josef Kony's notorious Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to operate freely within South Sudan as the report further observes that "the LRA was

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responsible for about twenty-five incidents in South Sudan in 2011” (Countries Report on Terrorism, 2011, p. 33). Given the LRA’s ability to operate effectively in South Sudan due to a lack of policing and adequate border control, it is easy to conclude that other terrorist organizations will find the region equally attractive. Therein, the cases of both Sudan and South Sudan demonstrate a lack of adequate governance having given rise to conditions favorable to terrorist activity in the Horn region. This reality becomes even more apparent when examining South Sudan’s neighbor to the southeast, the nation of Kenya.

Although the nation of Kenya has continued to suffer from being the target of terrorist attacks in the aftermath of 1998 embassy bombings, it would be unwise to characterize Kenya as solely being a victim state, as in fact poor governance has also contributed to Kenya’s proving a sanctuary and point of transit for terrorists. Whereas Kenya does boast a relatively robust infrastructure equipped with a national police force and capable intelligence services, the West Point’s Center for Combating Terrorism, in a report outlining terrorist activity in the Horn region, notes that central to a terrorism threat in Kenya is a “lack of effectiveness in investigating, arresting and convicting terrorists as well as more ordinary criminals” (West Point Report, 2011, p. 51-52) stemming from a rampant culture of corruption within Nairobi’s bureaucracy. A glaring example remains the case of Abdullah Ocalan, the longtime leader of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) who, contends the West Point report, was allowed by Kenyan officials to board a safe flight out of the country upon having “received \$40 million from the Turkish government” (West Point Report, 2011, p. 53) for allowing this in order that the Turks might detain Ocalan themselves. Although Ocalan no longer remains at large, his circumstances in Kenya remain instructive, in that terrorists with sufficient resources or state support might easily be able to use Kenya as a sanctuary if they are able to bribe certain officials with the right price. Moreover, such glaring corruption is likely to make it easier for terrorists to use airports and other official border points of entry as well as to obtain fake identity credentials and travel passports. Mohammad Sadeek Odeh, a Palestinian Al Qaeda operative sentenced to life imprisonment for his role in the 1998 US Embassy attacks, testified at his trial, the West Point report notes, that he “used fake travel documents obtained at a government Immigration office to leave Kenya the night before the attacks” (West Point Report, 2011, p. 53). While the United States does enjoy good relations with Nairobi and has thus achieved success in aiding Kenya to bolster its counterterrorism capacity, Rotberg cautions that “much of Kenya’s day-to-day preventative capacity will always be contingent on its easily bribable police personnel” (Rotberg, 2005, p. 20). This is particularly troublesome when considering the case of Fazul Abdullah Muhammad, an African Al Qaeda operative wanted in connection with both the 1998 US Embassy bombings as well as for the 2002 bombing of the Israeli owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, an attack that killed three Israelis as well as nine Kenyans. Although arrested twice by Kenyan police, Fazul escaped both times. Johnnie Carson, in a detailed analysis of the state of corruption within the Kenyan infrastructure, notes that “it is widely believed that during his first arrest, Fazul succeeded in bribing low-level Kenyan police officers into setting him free, and that during his second arrest, improper police procedures and sheer incompetence led to his escape” (Rotberg, 2005, p. 184). Given the severity of such examples, it is abundantly clear that if counterterrorism operations are to succeed in preventing Kenya from becoming a nexus of terrorist activity, that the culture of corruption within Nairobi’s infrastructure must be expunged lest terrorists continue to bribe their way into procuring sanctuary within Kenya’s borders without much fear of arrest. Lack of good governance as providing an atmosphere conducive to

terrorist activity in the Horn region arguably remains at its most blatant however upon examination of Somalia, the region's only failed state.

As a failed state, the nation of Somalia presents many threats to global security in terms of providing a sanctuary for terrorist organizations. Although scholars such as Ioannis Mantzikos have astutely pointed out that "a collapsed state is not necessarily an ideal location" (Mantzikos, 2011, p. 254) for terrorist organizations to seek haven as in fact the total absence of governance typically means that no foreigners will choose to reside in such territory due to rampant lawlessness, thus drastically reducing a foreign terrorist organization's ability to blend in with a more multicultural populace, by no means should it be interpreted that Somalia does not remain a hotbed for terrorist activity. John Davis, in a recent study of the current state of affairs in Somalia observes that "since the collapse of Somalia's central government, the country became a haven for a multitude of terrorist organizations" (Davis, 2010, p. 161). Most notable of such organizations remains the al Shabaab which, notes Davis, "has taken control of important towns inland and along the coast" (Davis, 2010, p. 162) all the while "entering into agreements with pirates operating from port cities under al Shabaab's control" (Davis, 2010, p. 162). Even more alarming is that al Shabaab maintains a significant al Qaeda presence throughout its organization. Following his escape from Kenya in the aftermath of the 2002 Paradise Hotel bombing, Fazul Abdullah Muhammad, along with known al Qaeda operatives Ali Saleh Nabhan and Issa Osman Issa, fell in with the leadership cadre of al Shabaab, a reality that Davis notes "prompted President Bush's Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer to express deep concern acknowledging that "We have said over and over again that the people responsible for the bombing of our embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam, are in Somalia. That constitutes a safe haven; we do not want it to become a further safe haven" (Davis, 2010, p. 162). Moreover, al Shabaab has attracted self radicalized recruits from across the globe. Indeed, scholar Mohammed Ibrahim keenly notes the well known instance "involving some 20 young Somali Americans who went to Somalia to join al-Shabaab, the largest known group of US citizens to join a foreign terrorist group" (Ibrahim, 2010, p. 286). Taken together with al Shabaab's maintaining an al Qaeda presence within its ranks, such instances lead Davis to reasonably conclude that "what is certain is that Somalia is and has been a host to indigenous and external terrorist groups that collectively have operated with near impunity" (Davis, 2010, p. 163-164) due to the absence of any substantial governing apparatus. Somalia as a failed state therefore represents a clear threat to both regional and global security and thus considerable effort should be maintained to bolster governance within its territory. Combined weak and failed governance in the key Horn nations of Somalia, Kenya, the Sudan and South Sudan has clearly generated circumstances conducive to terrorist sanctuary, transit, and operation. While other Horn countries do maintain stronger governance within their borders, further analysis of the Horn region reveals that regional instability still allows for the potential of vibrant terrorist activity to flourish within the Horn's confines.

Examples of Conflict and Hope: Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti

Although both Ethiopia and Eritrea feature regimes that have displayed relatively stronger governing capacity than many of their neighbors, ongoing conflict between the two countries has decreased regional stability, thereby increasing the reality of terrorist activity throughout the Horn. Terrence Lyons, in an extensive analysis of the Ethiopian- Eritrean dispute, notes that for its part, "Ethiopia has supported fragments of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF),

the Eritrean National Alliance (ENA), and other armed opposition movements” (Lyons, 2006, p. 16) in order to destabilize Eritrea, while Angel Rabasa observes that concurrently, “Ethiopia is fighting several secessionist movements, including the ethnic Somali Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), both backed by Eritrea” (Rabasa, 2009, p. 16). By engaging in such proxy battles contends Lyons, the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict “increases the opportunities for terrorist infiltration of the Horn and for ignition of a larger regional conflict” (Lyons, 2006, p. 4). Although a fragile peace currently exists between the two countries, the fact that both Eritrea and Ethiopia have used the conflict as justification to become increasingly repressive threatens to cause indigenous groups to seek outside assistance from transnational terrorist organizations. For example, a splinter faction of the ELA, known as the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM) is known to have ties to al Qaeda and, according to a special report from the Washington, DC Institute of Peace, enjoys considerable popular support due to the Eritrean government’s “detention of political prisoners deemed to be a risk to the nation” (Special Report, 2004, p. 13) under the guise of both cooperating with the US’s war on terror and of quelling dissent from segments of Eritrea’s population deemed to be in support of Ethiopia. Given the EIJM’s ties to al Qaeda as a case in point, Dan Connell warns that the increasingly authoritarian nature of the Eritrea regime renders it “a strong possibility that such indigenous movements will seek deeper affiliation or assistance from outside terrorist networks to further local agendas” (Rotberg, 2005, p. 65-66). Ethiopia has also used the conflict with Eritrea as justification to become more authoritative. A special report issued by the International Crisis Group observes that opposition parties within the Ethiopian government “have found it very difficult to play meaningful roles within the parliament” (Special Report, 2008, p. 11) exacerbated by “restrictions on the media that have made it difficult for them to communicate with their supporters, creating a vigorous rumor mill and fostering a culture where extreme views posted on internet site are the main form of political speech” (Special Report, 2008, p. 11-12). Moreover, conflict between Addis Ababa and the ONLF has led to what the report describes as “a major humanitarian emergency” (Special Report, 2008, p. 13) perpetrated by the Ethiopian military’s 2007 “brutal strategy of violence, collective punishment, restrictions on food aid and trade and forcing civilians into protected villages” (Special Report, 2008, p.13) in the Ogaden region. Therefore, such repression by the Ethiopian government may easily foment a culture of extremism amongst the Ogaden, and thus it is not a stretch to imagine that the ONLF would seek to network with terrorist organizations that would be able to provide needed support in exchange for sanctuary and safe transit for their operatives. While the situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea remains extremely volatile, prospect for mitigating the terrorist threat in the Horn region becomes brighter when examining the case of Djibouti, which has often been considered to be a vital port of entry into the Horn region for terrorists.

Although the tiny nation of Djibouti has proven in the past to be a vital port of entry into the Horn of Africa for terrorists, Djibouti’s burgeoning relationship with the United States has led to significantly improved governance within Djibouti’s borders, thus leading to a reduction in terrorist’s ability to use Djibouti as an entryway into greater Africa. Stipulating Djibouti’s past importance as a transit point for terrorists, Davis notes that “throughout the 1990s, the height of terror activities in the region, terror groups such as Al Qaeda and a host of Palestinian terrorist organizations used Djibouti as a transit point to carry out terrorist related activities against Western interests throughout Africa” (Davis, 2007, p. 33). Following the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 however, the US sought to cultivate a strong relationship with Djibouti, resulting in Djibouti’s becoming a hub of US counterterrorism efforts in Africa, a reality that

leads scholar Lange Schermerhorn to conclude that “Djibouti is not a bastion of terror, but rather a bastion against terrorism” (Rotberg, 2005, p. 58). Moreover, significant US presence in Djibouti has led US policymakers to authorize what Davis describes as the “significant injection of financial assistance” (Davis, 2007, p. 37) to the Djiboutian economy, thereby “enabling Djibouti to pursue the war on terrorism with greater veracity and resources” (Davis, 2007, p. 37) in addition to having the added benefit of bolstering Djibouti’s capacity to “undertake infrastructure and social programs essential to its medium and long term survival” (Davis, 2007, p. 37-38). Equally important, Rabasa notes that the CJTF-HOA, in addition to providing Djibouti and other Horn states with counterterrorism training and support, maintains a substantial civil affairs operation that has “proven critical in gaining the support of the Djiboutian population against terrorist elements” (Rabasa, 2009, p. 72). The CJTF-HOA’s efforts in this regard have not only led to the building of hospitals and schools within Djibouti itself but also to cross border operations into other Horn nations as exemplified in such operations as the drilling of wells in Kenya and the renovation of schools in Ethiopia. Also emanating from the US’s presence in Djibouti is the venerable East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI) which, notes Rabasa “seeks to bolster the security of the East African region by channeling funds into several key areas: (1) military training for border and coastal surveillance; (2) programs designed to strengthen the control of the movement of people and goods; (3) aviation security capacity-building; (4) assistance for regional efforts to counter terrorism financing; and (5) police training” (Rabasa, 2009, p. 72-73). Given the scope of such efforts, it is no small wonder that Djibouti remains the most stable country in the Horn region. While Davis is keen to note that “at some point the government of Djibouti must become self-sustaining” (Davis, 2007, p. 40) and not rely primarily upon US efforts to improve its governing capacity, the multifaceted approach that US policy has taken in the case of Djibouti has undeniably improved regional security. Thus, it stands to reason that such policy might be applied in a more comprehensive fashion across the Horn region, rendering special attention on a state by state basis to addressing specific issues that would strengthen governance across the region, therein decreasing a terrorist organization’s ability to utilize the Horn for sanctuary, transit, and operation.

Sounding the Horn: Implications for US Policy in the Aim of Mitigating East Africa’s Conduciveness to Terrorist Activity

As the foregoing analysis of the terrorist threat in the African Horn region clearly demonstrates, it is essential that US policy go beyond singular counterterrorism efforts and adopt a multifaceted approach towards the region that is designed to bolster each state’s capacity and willingness to both adequately and responsibly govern their respective territories. Indeed, Rabasa astutely notes that counterterrorism assistance alone, although of much value, “is unlikely to provide an effective long-term solution to the challenges of terrorism in East Africa” (Rabasa, 2009, p. 74); rather Rabasa contends that “an effective long term solution would require attacking the conditions that make the region hospitable to extremist and terrorist elements” (Rabasa, 2009, p. 75). Specifically of the value of adequate and responsible governance in the Horn region, Abdul Karim Bangura argues that “good governance and strong democratic governing institutions are an absolute necessity for development and the prevention of the expansion of terrorism” (Davis, 2010, p. 189) in East Africa. Towards the aim fostering good governance, the following recommendations, considered on a state by state basis and though by

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no means exhaustive, may well prove valuable in terms of effecting greater stability in the Horn region, therein reducing the region's conduciveness to terrorist activity.

Whereas the success that US military presence in Djibouti has experienced in terms of bringing greater stability to both Djibouti and the greater Horn region is indeed laudable, such success only constitutes a sufficient point of genesis, as indeed more expansive application of both the CJTF-HOA's and EACTI's efforts at building adequate state governance is required if long term success in mitigating the threat of terrorism in the Horn region is to be achieved. At a most basic level, Rabasa notes that, in addition to being largely understaffed due to a lack of sufficient regional and linguistic experts, the CJTF-HOA suffers from an inability to maintain adequate continuity; therein Rabasa contends that "to enhance the effectiveness and preserve the continuity of CJTF-HOA's interaction with regional militaries, the basing status of the CJTF-HOA should be changed from expeditionary to permanent; tours should be changed from unaccompanied and short term to accompanied and of longer duration" (Rabasa, 2009, p. 76). Additionally, a concerted effort should be undertaken to adequately staff the CJTF-HOA with regional and linguistic experts. Going beyond the basics of adequately staffing and preserving the continuity of the CJTF-HOA's mission, it is of vital interest that the US capitalizes on its position as a donor of considerable foreign aid to Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Kenya. Regarding Ethiopia and Eritrea, the US should leverage its position as a donor towards the effect of strengthening the fragile peace that currently exists between Addis Ababa and Asmara as well as to the effect of encouraging responsible governance by seeking to reduce both regimes' bent towards authoritarianism. Lyons adds that "Washington should also work with other donor countries and the World Bank to encourage sufficient leverage to encourage such reforms" (Lyons, 2006, p. 28). Not only would such efforts seek to reduce the risk of full blown regional conflict, but may also serve to decrease popular support for extremist organizations such as the ONLF and EIJM. Moreover, the US should also leverage its position as donor to both Ethiopia and Eritrea to discourage both states from supporting respective extremist groups including Ethiopia's support of the ELF and ENF as well as Eritrea's support of the ONLF and OLF towards the goal of destabilizing one another. In Kenya, the US should also leverage its position as a donor to encourage sweeping reforms vis-à-vis the culture of corruption that has proven so pervasive within the Kenyan bureaucracy. Carson observes that "as a result of poor pay and low professional standards, many policemen and immigration officials remain susceptible to corruption by criminal as well as terrorist elements" (Rotberg, 2005, p. 190). Consequently, the US should strongly encourage Nairobi to devote considerable resources to the aim of improving pay and training for its immigration and police forces, thereby decreasing the chances that terrorists will be able to bribe immigration officials in order to obtain false transit documents or to bribe police in order to avoid arrest and incarceration. While the US does not readily enjoy either good or extensive relations with other Horn nations, viable options still remain towards the aim of fostering adequate governance in the Sudan, the newly formed South Sudan, and Somalia.

Although the US has largely never enjoyed good relations with the Sudan, it has been able to coerce Khartoum in the past to take action against terrorist organizations previously enjoying sanctuary within the Sudan's borders. Meghan O' Sullivan, in an exhaustive analysis of the effectiveness of US sanctions implemented against a variety of regimes, notes that sanctions, in addition to changes within the Sudanese political arena, "deserve much of the credit for moving Sudan down the road to concluding that active support for terrorism was no longer in its interest" (O' Sullivan, 2003, p. 261). Not only did Khartoum thus expel Osama bin Laden, but also proved willing to sign all international conventions for combating terrorism and increase

bilateral cooperation with the US in an effort to have US sanctions alleviated and to be removed from the US State Department's list of states that sponsor terrorism. Consequently, the US should make it clear to Khartoum that if the Sudan is to be removed from the list of states that sponsor terrorism, then the Sudan must demonstrate a greater willingness to adequately govern and patrol its territory, namely the Jebel Kurish Mountain range in which Al Qaeda has established bases for the purposes of providing sanctuary and training for its operatives. Of the newly formed and fragile South Sudan, efforts should be readily expended to aid the fledgling state in developing a strong capacity to govern its territory. Both the CJTF-HOA and the EACTI, with their mandates and past efforts to improve governing capacity in the Horn region, should be tasked with the responsibility of developing contacts within South Sudan that will allow both institutions the opportunity to bolster the country's presently deficient policing and border control capability, thereby reducing the ability of the LRA and other extremist organizations to operate freely within South Sudan's borders. The US should also consider the prospect of directing a considerable foreign aid package to South Sudan contingent upon cooperation with CJTF-HOA and EACTI efforts to bolster the new country's governing capacity. Of all countries in the Horn region, Somalia, as a failed state, arguably poses the most difficult challenge to the goal of developing an effective strategy that will decrease the Horn region's conduciveness to terrorist activity. Regardless of such difficulty however, most scholars seem to agree that progress is in fact possible contingent upon the eventuality of al Shabaab being brought to heel. Indeed, Melissa Simpson contends that "rebuilding Somalia cannot occur until Al Shabaab is controlled" (Davis, 2010, p. 18). Towards this aim, Bronwyn Bruton, in a detailed proposal calling for a comprehensive US policy towards Somalia, argues that "the US should adopt a modified containment strategy that would involve a restrained counterterrorist military component, increased efforts to contain arms or other forms of outside support to the Shabaab and minimize regional instability, and internal actions to help develop alternatives to Shabaab control" (Bruton, 2010, p. 25). While by no means a panacea for Somalia's status as a failed state that is absent any real form of governance, containing Shabaab influence in such a manner as proposed by Bruton does present the dual benefit of preventing a complete Shabaab takeover of Somalia and therein limiting Al Qaeda's ability to hide its operatives within the cadre of Shabaab ranks. Taken together with the afore mentioned recommendations, containing Shabaab influence in Somalia remains a crucial element of bringing stability to the Horn region, thereby making the region more conducive to good governance, and therein, less conducive to terrorist activity. Indeed, if implemented collectively, such recommendations, while not exhaustive, provide important components of a US policy towards the Horn of Africa that is multifaceted, not focusing solely upon counterterrorism efforts, but rather instead bolstering counterterrorism efforts by encouraging good governance and regional stability, two realities that are crucial to achieving a long term goal of the Horn region proving largely incapable of being utilized by terrorists for sanctuary, transit, and operation.

Conclusions

Although the Horn of Africa region does not pose as considerable a terrorism threat to global security as does the Middle East, the foregoing analysis clearly demonstrates that it would be of great folly for the US and its allies to take the region lightly. Lack of adequate governance in the Sudan, the newly formed South Sudan, Kenya, and Somalia has created a reality of deficient border patrol, policing, and control of sovereign territory that has readily made the

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Horn region conducive to terrorist activity. While both Ethiopia and Eritrea retain a stronger capacity for governance, the ongoing conflict between Addis Ababa and Asmara not only threatens to undermine regional stability, but has also created a culture in which both regimes have supported extremist organizations in order to undermine one another. Moreover, both regimes have used the ongoing conflict as justification to become increasingly authoritarian, implementing restrictions that have engendered popular support for extremist groups with known ties to Al Qaeda. Djibouti, although proving to be the most stable country in the Horn region, remains so inarguably because of a strong US initiative to provide both counterterrorism assistance and to bolster adequate governance. Given the reality of the Horn region's proven conduciveness for terrorist activity, any success achieved in the case of Djibouti only underscores the need for a comprehensive, multifaceted US policy that not only provides counterterrorism assistance to regional states, but also encourages, supports, and requires that Horn states take steps to institute adequate and responsible governance throughout their respective territories. The recommendations outlined in this paper, though by no means exhaustive, may well constitute substantial progress in this regard if implemented collectively. Failure to implement such a multifaceted policy however, indeed poses significant detriment to global security, as the lack of adequate and responsible governance in the Horn region only increases the capability of terrorist organizations to utilize the region for sanctuary, transit, and operation. Osama bin Laden certainly understood the importance of such reality well, having used the Sudan as a haven in which to establish the world's first truly global terrorist organization, then utilizing sanctuary in Afghanistan to plan the September 11th attacks without hindrance or impunity. Therein, the Horn of Africa must not become a region in which terrorist organizations are allowed to thrive and operate without impunity. Such importance leads Lyman and Morrison to correctly warn that "if Washington underplays the terrorist threat in Africa, its worldwide strategy against terrorism will falter- and the consequences may be dire indeed" (Lyman & Morrison, 2004, p. 86). While these consequences may indeed be dire, they are not inevitable, and as such, the United States should in all haste and deliberateness implement a comprehensive and multifaceted policy designed to bolster governing capacity throughout the Horn region, thereby reducing the region's conduciveness to terrorist activity.

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